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EPISTEMIC VIRTUE, RELIGIOUS 
EXPERIENCE, AND BELIEF 
J ames A. Montmarquet 
This paper defends the "epistemic virtuousness" at least of tentative religious 
conviction based on religious experience. The virtues of' openness' and 'intel-
lectual humility' are contrasted with the skeptic's 'closedness' and 'intellectual 
hubris.' 
The framework of this paper is provided by "virtue epistemology";1 its 
subject is religious experience - or, more accurately, the range of suitable 
belief-related attitudes to which religious experience may give rise. Its con-
clusions occupy a kind of middle ground - roughly equidistant, I would 
judge, from the certitudes of the "true believer" and the "disinterested 
agnosticism" of the nonbeliever. For it endorses an attitude primarily of 
openness, of wishing to probe, even as we accept (in intellectual humility) 
our cognitive limitations regarding, the mysteries of religion. 
I. Epistemic Virtue. 
My initial position is that one is only criticizable (in the sense of blamewor-
thy) for one's doxastic states (beliefs or failures to believe) insofar as one is 
guilty of a certain type of epistemic vice, typified by such cases as wishful 
thinking, closed-mindedness, intellectual laziness, or sheer carelessness in 
thinking or reasoning. These vices are appropriate bases for personal criti-
cism insofar as they embody two central features required for - or, at the 
very least, especially suited to - such criticism. First, they are subject to 
one's control- one's fairly direct, albeit not complete control- and in this 
regard are distinguishable from mere capacities like power of recall or 
visual acuity. A person can be asked or even commanded to keep an open 
mind, to pay close attention, not to jump to any hasty conclusions - but 
only to "try your best" regarding the use of such capacities again as good 
vision or memory. Second, such virtues bear an "internal connection" to 
the central value in relation to which one is held blameworthy (in failing to 
exemplify them) - that is to say, all of these vices involve some shortfall in 
one's efforts (regarding truth). Thus, closed-mindedness involves a failure 
to be "open" - but to what (if not the possibility of truth)? Likewise, "care" 
would be a specifically epistemic virtue insofar as it involves care in arriv-
ing at correct - i.e., true - beliefs. 
Other, quite different accounts have conceived epistemic virtues as 
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merely qualities or capacities apt to produce true beliefs (and not to pro-
duce false ones).' This is not the place to raise issues with such theories, 
except to make this one point. Our own approach - focused on a concept 
of praise and blame sensitive virtues, and eschewing any particular regard 
for knowledge and knowledge-yielding justification - has at least this 
desirable feature. It can raise epistemic - as opposed to merely practical 
- concerns regarding religious experience and belief, without almost 
immediately bogging down in such stalemated issues as whether religious 
experiences can be "reliable" sources of knowledge - or whether, more 
generally, they may provide such "justification" as would be required for 
knowledge. Along these lines, we are able to mount an original defense of 
religious belief - without falling into 'mere pragmatism' (views merely that 
we are "better off" - say, happier or more apt to produce happiness for 
others - with these convictions). 
A second main feature of my working account of epistemic virtue should 
be mentioned here at the start, as it will emerge later as quite central to my 
argument. Assignments of epistemic virtue and vice - and epistemic 
praiseworthiness and blameworthiness - must be regarded as context sen-
sitive, and especially as sensitive to considerations of moral risk. Thus, take 
the case of Leopold Bloom of Ulysses fame, strolling about Dublin forming 
all sorts of beliefs: some spontaneous, some born of a bit of reflection, some 
quite ridiculous, some quite ordinary. Now, from an intuitive standpoint, I 
do not think that we want to judge Bloom as "blameworthy" - morally or in 
any other way - even for his more casually or carelessly formed beliefs. I 
explain this intuition by citing the obvious: there is no evident reason for 
Bloom to be more careful, more discerning, or more skeptical in his interior 
monologue. Even in his more ridiculous beliefs, Bloom is, I would add, not 
really all that different from the rest of us - were our ("unedited") stream 
of consciousness to be held up to public view. 
If, then, Bloom should say to himself, "Why, that's Paddy McGuire over 
there" - only to hastily correct himself when the person comes into much 
fuller view - ordinarily we would not "blame" or otherwise chastise him 
for the first belief. But, of course, if Bloom is in the process of pointing out 
Paddy for a Sinn Fein sniper (who will shoot immediately on Bloom's 
hand-signaled identification), everything changes. Even if Bloom feels 
quite certain, at the original distance, that this is Paddy, we will fault him 
for his too hasty certainty - all the more if it is attributable to his longstand-
ing personal dislike of McGuire. In this case, great care - and certainly a 
control of one's personal biases - is required, and Bloom has greatly fallen 
short in both regards. 
The point, then, is that, broadly speaking, our estimations of whether 
some blameworthy shortfall of virtue has taken place will be relative to 
such act or acts as may be in prospect - and what their foreseeable conse-
quences may be. This will lead to a second advantage of the approach 
taken here. Although our concern is with the epistemic and not the moral 
value of religious experience and belief, we are able to explore one very 
close link between narrowly epistemic and larger moral concerns in this 
regard. Even if one denies, as I would deny, that the knowledge-status of 
religious beliefs depends on what acts one may be contemplating based 
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thereupon, it must be plausible, or very much more plausible, to hold that 
how much care, open-mindedness and other such virtues as may be 
required in forming (or continuing to hold) a given belief - that this will 
depend on such essentially practical considerations as the likely moral con-
sequences of one's being in error.3 
This has a second liberating effect. It allows a fairly liberal standard for 
virtue and praiseworthiness in the case of religious belief - roughly, as 
long as no morally risky acts are going to be predicated on such beliefs. It 
offers, one could even say, a measure of doxastic freedom - but at the 
expense of risky, religiously based acts. Just as Bloom is not held to a very 
high standard of virtue until such point as serious negative consequences 
may ensue if he is wrong, the "model believer" contemplated here - open, 
humble and possessed of other relevant virtues - has considerable latitude, 
roughly, until such point as what she contemplates could be morally dan-
gerous. 
II. Religious Experience 
We tum now to "religious experience," a dauntingly wide, ill-defined, and 
variously approached territory. Here I will follow William James in The 
Varieties of Religious Experience" in not attempting to define so much as to 
focus matters. James himself 'defines' not religious experience, but religion 
itself, as 
the feelings, acts and individual experiences of individual men so far 
as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they 
may consider the divine (39). 
This, however, serves James as a characterization mainly of religious 
experience, for he takes such experiences to represent the core of what is 
truly valuable, distinctive, and intellectually interesting in this subject. For 
my part, without rejecting this or any other characterization, I shall want to 
focus things a bit more narrowly. In particular, I want to begin with the 
following distinction. There may be occasions when the depth of one's 
religious response is entirely intelligible, given the apparently miraculous 
nature of what one has just witnessed. In other cases, however, an individ-
ual may have an experience in the context of religious worship, where the 
very depth and intensity of the experience is itself an important part of 
what leads one - of course the ostensible object of these experiences would 
be another - to make an affirmation of its supernatural character.' 
This is not an experience of the miraculous - though one might some-
times want to describe such a thing as a "miraculous experience." More 
particularly, I am interested in these two other, likely aspects of such expe-
riences: 
First, such features of them as are "numinous" (to use the famous appel-
lation of Rudolph Ottd) - as are apt to arouse such strong feelings as awe, 
wonder, and dread, what Otto picturesquely describes as the experience of 
the "mysterium tremendum." 
Second, and along the same lines, I am interested in such aspects of 
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these experiences as may give rise to deep feelings of mystery - not of defi-
nite answers so much as haunting questions. Such experiences will not 
strike one as "revelatory" but will, at most, leave one with an impression of 
having "seen through a glass darkly." They will occasion, even demand, 
further reflection - not because they reveal answers, but because of the 
way in which they do not. If they do not reveal, they suggest; if they do 
not deliver anything, they promise much. 
III. The virtue of 'openness' - and a vice of skepticism 
"The mystic is, in short, invulnerable, and must be left, whether we 
relish it or not, in undisturbed enjoyment of his creed ... But I now 
proceed to add that mystics have no right to claim that we ought to 
accept the deliverance of their peculiar experiences, if we are our-
selves outsiders and feel no private call thereto." (Wm. James, 
Varieties, 415) 
What is an epistemically responsible attitude not to mystical experiences 
but to the kind of more ordinary experiences characterized in the previous 
section?? Even here, I want to say that something like James' distinction is 
helpful - but as applied to the subject herself. When such religious expe-
riences are going on, it is hard to speak of "epistemic virtue" at all, for to 
expect the subject to adopt a stance, even of the mildest scrutiny - lest she 
not affirm something that is not true - would be to interfere greatly with 
the experience (as a specifically religious one). While they are continuing, 
her experiences are, as James would say, "authoritative" for her. This is 
not to say that, during such episodes, the mind is somehow powerless to 
exert special efforts of "epistemic scrutiny" for that is certainly not so. 
Again, the point would rather be that inasmuch as such states are genuine-
ly to be experienced, one ought not to do anything whose effect would be 
greatly interfering with their natural and normal character. 
Nor can the issue be one of our being required to enter into such experi-
ences for "pure" (affectively neutral, merely truth-investigating) motives, as 
this, too, could but have a very limiting, not to say, injurious, effect on 
these experiences (again, as specifically religious ones).8 Some experiences 
need to be entered into - really can only be satisfactorily appreciated as 
experiences - if they are entered into for motives specific to them, and not 
ones merely of curiosity or investigative intent. Certainly, in the case of 
love, one who tried to fall in love, but mainly just to see "what the experi-
ence was like" would likely fail - or if he did succeed, would certainly 
have distorted the experience of love (as long as he maintained this observ-
er's stance). Thus, in the end, a primary commitment to the observer's role 
generates a paradox: we are at best distorting the very thing a commitment 
to truth would have us accurately represent. 
The most important issue, then, must surely concern what attitudes an 
epistemically virtuous individual would take in reference to such experi-
ences when she is neither in nor about to enter into them - in particular, 
when she is reflecting (in a calm moment) about them. Should one, for 
instance, have a positive, encouraging attitude, perhaps doing such things 
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and encouraging such states of mind as might support or reinforce the 
effects of their previous occurrence (or even add to the likelihood of their 
occurrence in the future); or should one take a more cautious, even a suspi-
cious or hostile, attitude? 
My first suggestion would be this. A measure of openness to such expe-
riences surely would be epistemically virtuous; a corresponding "closed-
mindedness" would be a vice. Obviously, openness is (open-mindedness) 
is itself an epistemic virtue (and closed-mindedness is, in its general ten-
dency a vice). Beyond that, openness in this specific case promises, at the 
very least, to reveal aspects of ourselves - and of the nature of our own 
responses in an environment in which deep mysteries, and at least vague, 
incomplete answers to these mysteries may be experienced. Even if we 
remain noncommittal as to the ultimate truth of these "answers," a mea-
sure of openness to them - so long as it is not carried to the point of inter-
fering with other, definite good things - would surely be appropriate. 
Openness, after all, requires only the promise - and not necessarily the 
proof - of epistemic rewards. 
In this regard, a skeptic who refused to put himself in situations in 
which he was apt to have such experiences would seem to be just as 
"closed-minded" as a believer who refused to consider skeptical argu-
ments or anything apt to disturb her faith. Neither would appear to be 
exactly virtuous, from the standpoint of truth and inquiry. Our skeptic 
may complain that, unlike the other, he is open to every argument and posi-
tion - but this would seem very much an unduly "intellectualist" or "anti-
experiential" attitude. What would we say, correspondingly, of one who 
disdained all sexual activity but was steadfastly "open" to arguments, pro 
and con, about the value of this? (Perhaps there is a moral or prudential 
case to be made for his stance, but there is not much to be said for it epis-
temically) We do know that some things have to be experienced, in order to 
assess their true value.9 
My charge against the skeptic, then, amounts to this: "openness" to the 
supernatural (or the possibility thereof) involves more than openness to 
arguments.1O To this, the skeptic may retort that in being open to all such 
arguments, one is being open to all such evidence that religious experiences 
may yield. But I can think of two fairly telling replies to this: 
First, any argument will at best propositionally encode certain aspects of 
an experience. If the argument is "pro-religious faith," it will encode such 
aspects as would appear to favor that conclusion. But if "one picture is 
worth a thousand words," one experience must be many times richer 
("informationally" and not just "experientially" - than its propositional 
description). Thus, any claim that one is considering via arguments, "all 
such evidence that such experiences may yield" will be mistaken In fail-
ing to experience the full richness of "the real thing," one is only taking 
cognizance of a very impoverished version of this richness. 
Second, even such talk of "evidence" begs more fundamental questions 
concerning the nature of the decision process involved in partaking of rele-
vant experiences. Not every rational decision procedure, we must remind 
ourselves, is one of argument and the consideration of arguments. In cer-
tain quite important areas of life, decision is more a matter of having rele-
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vant experiences, reflecting on those experiences (including considering 
relevant arguments), and then, more passively, just seeing what choice 
"sits best with one." A decision process may certainly include the 
appraisal of relevant arguments - without reducible to mere consideration 
of arguments. 
To expand on this last idea, certainly some choices (e.g., among rival 
scientific hypotheses) may consist in mere argument appraisals, but others 
- say, the choice of a mate - will not. Some choices - most notably, this 
last one - are such that one must quite literally "live with" the results. 
Such a choice may happen to coincide with the conclusion of an argument, 
but there is no guarantee that this happy result will obtain. If the conclu-
sion of an argument is something one cannot seem to live with, of course 
one possibility is to adjust one's choice to that conclusion. But this cannot 
be the right solution to any and all such cases - especially not when one 
has considered and given some weight to the various arguments, and still 
finds oneself fundamentally dissatisfied. In the case of choosing a mate, 
the point is of course clear: even if a seemingly irrefutable argument 
should select A, if one still finds oneself fundamentally resisting this choice 
in favor of B, at some point it becomes, I would think, a mere irrational 
prejudice in favor of "arguments" not to resist,'! 
IV. Intellectual humility 
My next point would concern such attitudes as wonder and awe - charac-
teristic of the "numinous" experience alluded to earlier. These are notable 
for my project partly because they involve experiences likely to prompt 
belief in the non-argumentative manner just discussed. That is, such expe-
riences might easily lead one to a state of belief - might easily lead an 
embrace of the supernatural as something that ultimately "sits well" with 
one (or "sits better" with one than a lack of such embrace) - but without 
necessarily providing an argument to that ef£ectY 
Yet, there is another way in which "the numinous" is important in this 
connection. Feelings of awe, wonder, and the like are salutary in helping to 
induce a certain type of "intellectual humility" (alluded to earlier). Now, 
humility in matters religious has traditionally, and rightly, been understood 
mainly as a moral virtue. Partly as a result of this, intellectual humility, 
unfortunately, has been neglected in the processY Such humility would 
involve, mainly, I suggest, a profound sense of the limited powers of what 
one knows - and can know from one's rather small position relative to the 
immensity and complexity of the physical universe - and to what might 
involve an even greater disparity: between the limitations of one's own spir-
itual powers and the possible immensity of the spiritual universe. 
Thus, such humility is deeply connected to experiences of the" mysterium 
tremendum" for these may easily impress such disparities on one - without 
any paradoxical claim that one "knows" or adequately comprehends their 
dimensions. Notice, too, that such humility has a further implication in the 
present connection. The skeptic is pleased to reflect on our limited powers 
of knowing, and the relative unlikelihood that the world as it is will hap-
pen to coincide with the world as we take it to be. Yet the skeptic'S "humil-
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ity" bears the seeds of a kind of intellectual hubris. For the skeptic takes 
certain considerations as exempting him from such experiences and, more 
generally, such "practices" by which persons have sought God. That 
"there may be more things in heaven and on earth than are dreamt of in 
your philosophy" can be, in its opposition to the skeptical philosopher, a 
legitimate expression of intellectual humility. The opposed attitude - that 
there are no such things, or even, that I refuse to engage in such experi-
ences as might alter my perspective on this possibility - may be corre-
spondingly taken as an expression of intellectual arrogance. 
V. Belief 
Seen in this light, then, a patient, continuing interest in religious experi-
ences, a wish to probe them, an openness to, and an intellectual humility 
regarding, the distinctive experiences of the "numinous" may reasonably 
be taken as intellectually virtuous. But now we should focus more narrow-
lyon what is surely the most important of cognitive attitudes: belief(includ-
ing degrees thereof)? What does epistemic responsibility call for here? 
Certainly, one would not want to claim here that such experiences, even 
if they induce belief in the supernatural during their occurrence, should be 
reflectively comprehended with full belief in their supernatural aspects. Just 
because one has had an experience of "Jesus giving one assurance," this 
does not mean that one should be reflectively convinced that this is exactly 
what has happened. For that would likely evince a rather hasty, precipi-
tate - and one could even say, an intellectually impatient attitude toward 
the objects of religious belief. It would defeat, or go completely against the 
grain of, the kind of exploratory, open attitude we have been extolling - for 
it would be as though one already "had the answer" or an important part 
of the answer. Here I might again quote William James, as his attitude is 
precisely the one I wish to endorse: 
I reject this dogmatic ideal not out of perverse delight in intellectual 
instability. I am no lover of disorder and doubt as such. Rather do I 
fear to lose tmth by this pretension to possess it already wholly. That 
we can gain more of it by moving in the right direction, I believe as 
much as anyone ... (Varieties, 327) 
My 'Jamesian' ideal learner, then, might be described as a kind of "wise 
beginner" (just the opposite of the "wise fool" of sophomoric tendencies). 
She does not and, as learner, will not give full assent to a story, of which he 
has, in all likelihood, experienced, only a part. Too much evidently 
remains to be experienced for her to reach any very hard and fast conclu-
sions concerning the exact nature of what she has experienced to date. She 
is "wise" inasmuch as one is approaching this as a reflective adult, not a 
mere child. Yet she does preserve something of the kind of "childlike won-
der" - characteristic even of such scientific minds as Albert Einstein and 
Richard Feynman.14 If our wise beginner moves forward, it is with 
extreme caution; if she is learning, she is more impressed with how much 
she has not learned or even begun to understand. 
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In addition, notice that our wise beginner, insofar as she is epistemically 
virtuous, will contemplate doing nothing of a morally risky nature - say, 
"persecuting heretics" or even voting for a "born again" candidate whose 
political agenda seems morally questionable. For one thing, she is far too 
insecure in her incipient convictions to undertake acts that would qualify 
as morally bad - should those convictions prove false. Also, since the acts 
she contemplates, based on whatever tentative convictions she may pos-
sess - since these acts are morally very safe, recall that the appropriate stan-
dards of epistemic virtue for the beliefs underlying such acts will be rela-
tively modest, and ones she will easily have met. If she thinks that God 
has revealed himself in an experience of hers, she may quite safely pray 
that this will happen again. Obviously, such an act (her prayer) - no mat-
ter what the status of its underlying belief - can do little or no harm. 
Insofar, then, as this "safety first" policy remains in effect, a kind of limited 
doxastic freedom will obtain. One's initial openness may well lead to some 
level of perhaps quite tentative commitment. Even if such initial credence 
is not actively challenged, or scrutinized, in times of reflection - it is not 
clear that such challenge or scrutiny is particularly called for. Certainly the 
kind of intense critical examination as might cause one to lose all convic-
tion would not be - as long as merely safe acts are contemplated. 
But, of course, this is not to say at all that full conviction is called for here 
- or that full conviction would be "virtuous." For full conviction involves a 
double difficulty in this connection: 
(i) Even if one contemplates no particular acts, the mere fact of one's 
being convinced - I think we can say, based in part on the lessons of histo-
ry - the mere fact of one's being quite certain of a religious belief, this car-
ries serious moral risks. For even if no particular act is contemplated, situ-
ations in which one might act to the disadvantage of those not sharing 
one's beliefs, these could well arise. 
(ii) At the same time, given the rather limited experiences available to 
our "wise beginner," full conviction is certainly apt to have been pur-
chased by epistemically unvirtuous means - e.g., focusing closed-minded-
ly only on reasons one has to take one's experiences as "veridical" or as 
confirming some particular religion, deliberately shunning the company of 
those who might question one's convictions, and so forth. 
It is important to recognize, then, that as one's degree of certainty 
increases, two separate factors conspire, or are apt to have conspired, to 
work against the virtue of one's belief state. Just as a higher level of virtue 
would be required of one, the likelihood is that one is exhibiting actually 
exhibiting a lower and not a higher level. By the same token, our wise 
beginner's more hesitant, probing, openness to religious mystery - this 
would be doubly endorsed: as an expression of relatively high virtue in 
proportion to moral risk. 
VI. Faith 
We have thus far taken care not to let our "beginner" take on too much for 
herself, either in terms of what he believes or does. But, especially on the 
side of belief, this may leave her, and the present theory, open to the fol-
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lowing objection, likely to emanate from the defender of faith and full con-
viction: 
Religious experience can and should give rise to religious belief. But 
this can only happen via faith. Without faith, there is no genuinely 
progressive element to lead us deeper, further into the mysteries of 
religion and religious experience. Without faith, we remain 'begin-
ners' (as you say), we can continue to probe the edges; but we are not 
making intellectual or emotional progress. There is, as one might put 
it, a "dialectic" between experience and faith: experience helps to 
induce faith; but without faith itself, experience remains merely ten-
tative and therefore, even as experience, much less profound that it 
would otherwise be. You, however, seem willing to endorse only the 
first element of this dialectic; you allow experience to induce perhaps 
some small element of faith; but you do not allow a separate act of 
faith to induce and enrich experience. 
How, then, will our "wise beginner" ever advance, ever become more 
than a mere beginner? Here I begin by throwing the question back to my 
fideistic critic. How, relative to our discussion of epistemically virtuous 
and unvirtuous ways of proceeding, does this critic want her (the wise 
beginner) to proceed? 
We must suppose, first off, that this objector is not suggesting that our 
beginner adopt un virtuous strategies, e.g., ignoring arguments against her 
incipient convictions, and so forth. For any such suggestion would have 
but, as Russell used to say, "the advantages of theft over honest toiL" 
Nor can we suppose that the suggestion is that she should, as it were, 
"become convinced by a sheer act of will." Obviously, it is hardly clear 
that this is possible - and even if it were, hardly clear that this would 
express anything like a virtuous tendency. 
Still, there is the possibility that our wise beginner might simply affirm -
and be called upon by our objector to affirm - regularly what she only 
partly believes. This, in contrast to the preceding, seems quite a reasonable 
suggestion, as such affirmation, in the first place, would be subject to one's 
control, and would not have to be epistemically unvirtuous at all. 
Affirming, after all, is an act - as much subject to one's control as any other 
act. Moreover, such affirmation seemingly could be offered by our begin-
ner in full cognizance of the limitations of her experiences. In general, 
notice, one may quite easily affirm - in the face of evidentiary difficulties -
something of which one might only have become fully convinced by 
means of wishful thinking or other epistemic vices. I can tell myself "I am 
going to jump that wall" - temporarily blocking out, but not unvirtuously, 
the evidence against this. By contrast, the corresponding stable conviction 
(that I will jump that wall) might need to be purchased by wishful thinking 
or other epistemic vices.15 
Here, however, a difficulty would seem to arise. Even if we allow that 
one may virtuously affirm a proposition for such limited, short-term pur-
poses as jumping a fence, may one virtuously do this in order to alter, to 
deepen, one's beliefs? My answer is this. Up to a point, it is not unvirtuous 
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to strengthen such convictions by affirmation - not, at least, when one is 
simply attempting to resist the natural erosion of conviction, following the 
dying of such experiences as may have excited it. Mere passage of time 
will, as a matter of plain fact, tend to diminish convictions born of unusual 
experiences. But mere passage of time does not, as such, render such con-
victions any more, or any less, solidly founded. Now, to be sure, it is 
unvirtuous to suppress the natural consequences of time - when these give 
rise to questioning reflections; that, however, is not what we are endorsing. 
The idea is merely that the encroachments of time may, to a degree, be vir-
tuously resisted - and that affirmation can help to playa role in this regard. 
Affirmation, then, may surely be viewed as an episternically virtuous, or 
certainly not unvirtuous, response to time and its effects. But there is 
another highly relevant consideration here, which is the contextuality of 
assessments of epistemic virtue. We have already indicated that, as one's 
religious convictions might approach complete certainty, two factors -
ones of moral risk and of virtue - conspire to make one's epistemic posi-
tion more perilous. As we have also indicated, however, at the lower 
ranges of the scale of conviction, one gets a much freer rein from a virtue 
standpoint - and this would certainly apply to the case at hand (that of 
affirmation). So long as our wise beginner avoids morally risky acts (based 
on her incipient convictions), there is no reason why, up to a point, she can-
not effect increases in her degree of conviction - within safe virtue parame-
ters. If it is still wrong (unvirtuous) for her to rigorously suppress all 
doubts and considerations apt to lead her to doubt, it is hardly clear that 
the relative absence of such doubts and doubting reflections, and the gentle 
encouragement of belief - that this must be counted unvirtuous, at least at 
this stage of conviction. 
In short, then, some progress, clearly, will be possible for our beginner. 
To be sure, this progress will be slow - and will predictably become much 
slower as her degree of conviction increases. (Something like the doxastic 
equivalent of "diminishing returns" will apply.) But, at the end of the day, 
may it not be that a lack of rapid progress is simply part of the price of 
maintaining one's virtue - in matters of faith and belief (as much as in 
morals)? Presumably, there is no available, epistemically virtuous "short 
cut" to full religious conviction. 
VII. Against the skeptic - again 
On our other flank, however, the skeptic has been lying in wait. At this 
point, he may simply wish to maintain that if religious experience cannot 
yield, or be shown to yield, epistemic justification, and thus knowledge -
it is of no real epistemic value and thus, such "virtues" as it may embody 
must be merely practical and not epistemic after all. 
To this implicit dilemma - either knowledge-yielding or not epistemi-
cally relevant at all - I reply as follows. Even a skeptic - no, especially a 
skeptic - must be sensitive to the point that if the beliefs on which we 
presently base our actions should prove false or epistemically unjustified, 
we still need to be able to allow that we have been entitled (epistemically) 
to act on them - or some of them, at any rate. In other words, we still need 
EPISTEMIC VIRTUE, RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE & BELIEF 479 
to be able to allow that these beliefs (or some of them) possessed sufficient 
epistemic credentials of some sort for our acts to be "justified" - to have 
whatever sort of moral credential they would not possess in the absence of 
this epistemic credential. My solution to this is to treat virtue as, in effect, 
"practically justifying" acts (based on a given set of beliefs.) The skeptic, 
quite obviously, owes us an account of his own. 
The skeptic may now deploy this new line of argument. "I will allow, 
what is a mere tautology, that when acting on religious belief will do no 
harm, there is nothing ethically wrong with acting on such beliefs - but this 
fails to distinguish them from plainly just silly beliefs (e.g., in the "tooth 
fairy") - as long as they, too, are practically harmless." 
The answer, or short answer, to this difficulty would be to contrast the 
rootedness of religious belief in experience with the lack of that type of root-
edness of "silly" or "arbitrary" beliefs (however harmless). The "tooth 
fairy" will, no doubt, have had her (or his) day, and those with "faith" in 
this being will perhaps have had associated experiences - but, ultimately, it 
will be the very limited character of these in the life of children that marks 
this as "silly" - and not truly, or very deeply, religious in character. 
Tennessee State University 
NOTES 
1. For a fuller statement of my views on this matter, see my Epistemic Virtue 
and Doxastic Responsibility (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1993); and "An 
Internalist Theory of Epistemic Virtue," in Guy Axtell, ed., Knowledge, Belief, and 
Character (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000). 
2. I refer here, most prominently, to the views of Alvin Goldman, e.g., in such 
classic papers as "What is Reliable Belief?" in George Pappas, ed. Justification and 
Knowledge (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1979) and Ernest Sosa's virtue-oriented 
reliabilism, e.g., in his classic, Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge UP., 
1991). The source of Goldman's own virtue epistemology is "Epistemic Folkways 
and Scientific Epistemology," in Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Social Sciences 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992) 
3. In his famous "Ethics of Belief," essay, William Gifford writes: 'If a belief is 
not realized immediately in open deeds, it is stored for guidance of the future .... 
No real belief, however trifling and fragmentary it may seem, is ever truly insignifi-
cant; it prepares us for more of its like, confirms those which resembled it before, 
and weakens others; and so gradually it lays a stealthy train in our inmost thoughts 
which may some day explode into action and leave its stamp on our character for-
ever.' This is reprinted (e.g.) in Louis Pojman, ed. The Theory of Knowledge (Belmont, 
Ca.: Wadsworth, 1993), p. 502}. However, even if we suppose all of Gifford's con-
tentions here to be true, this hardly shows that we must, regardless of what acts we 
are able to foresee, and for such purely general reasons as Clifford proposes, pay 
special regard to each and every belief that we may happen to form, lest we believe 
wrongly. Such a policy, besides being impossible to carry out, would in many 
cases be counter-productive. As Bloom meditates on some triviality, a trolley may 
run over his foot. 
4. Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: Barnes and Nobel, 2004), reprint 
of the 1902 version; page references to the former volume are inserted parentheti-
cally. 
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5. William Hasker, "The Epistemic Value of Religious Experience," in Thomas 
Senor, ed., The Rntionality of Belief and the Plurality of Faiths: Essays in Honor of William 
P. Alston (Ithaca: Cornell u.P, 1995), makes a helpful distinction between two types 
of epistemological appeal to "religious experience": construing it as a perception of 
religious objects; and construing it as something whose best explanation appeals to 
these same objects. In a sense, my own view inclines to the latter, but with this 
important reservation: I am not interested in this as a type of "argument from expe-
rience" so much as a description of what I will eventually defend as a "virtuous 
tendency" (to believe). 
6. The Idea of the Holy, John Harvey tr. (Oxford: Oxford UP., 1950). 
7. This, by the way, is not to suggest that only experiences describable as 
broadly 'mystical' or' numinous' might qualify as religious. For quite an account 
of the range of this topic, see, for instance, Ann Taves, Fits, Trances and Visions: 
Experiencing Religion and Explaining Experiellce from Wesley to James (Princeton: 
Princeton u.P., 1999). 
8. Here perhaps "truth-seeking" should be distinguished from "investiga-
tive." The latter would be disruptive of religious experience, the former not. Linda 
Zagzebski has made a relevant distinction, here, between merely wishing to have a 
certain belief (what would be irresponsible, unvirtuous) and wishing that a certain 
thing be true (what need not be irresponsible at all). If I call to find out the result of 
a game on which I have bet my life savings, presumably I seek to know the true 
result - yet though I am hardly neutral on this outcome. I am not "merely investi-
gating" but that does not make my conduct intellectually irresponsible. See her dis-
cussion in "Intellectual Motivation and the Good of Truth," in Zagzebski and M. 
DePaul, eds., Intellectual Virtue (Oxford: Oxford u.P., 2003). 
9. To be sure, a celibate who, relying on the testimony of others, granted a cer-
tain "experiential value" to sexual things may not be "closed-minded" at all, for 
there is nothing wrong, in such matters, with relying on the testimony of others -
so long as one is not using the absence of personal experiences to reach a conclu-
sion that seems to depend specifically on that absence. 
10. I suppose here, purely for the sake of argument, that such contemporary 
defenders of arguments from experience - see (e.g.) William Alston, Perceiving God: 
The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca: Cornell UP.,1991); Carolyn Franks 
Davis, The Evidentiary Force of Religious Experience (Oxford: Oxford V.P., 1989); Keith 
Yandell, The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge u.P., 1993); 
and Richard Swinburne, The Exis tence of God (Oxford: Oxford V.P., 1979) - have not 
made their case. I hold no brief against these authors, except to insist, for reasons I 
develop here, that the resources of experiential appeals are not limited to argu-
ments. 
11. Of course, some might say that at some point one's preference becomes a 
kind of argument for itself. The fact that one is fundamentally dissatisfied with all 
other conclusions becomes itself an argument favoring a certain choice. That, how-
ever, basically concedes the point I wish to make: that one's preference must some-
times hold sway - at least where it is back by suitable experiences. 
12. This is not to say that there could not be such an argument. See in this 
regard Yandell, The Epistemology of Religious Experience. 
13. Even such a thorough theistic philosopher as Robert C. Roberts offers an 
account of intellectual humility pitched entirely to rather mundane concerns like 
one's absence of excessive desires for professional status, and so forth. See Roberts 
and W. Jay Wood, "Humility and Intellectual Goods," in L. Zagzebski and M. 
DePaul, eds., Intellectual Virtue. 
14. An interesting account of a graduate student's encounter with Feynman 
still child-like in old age is Leonard Mldinow's Feynman's Rainbow: A Search for 
Beauty in Physics and in Life (New York: Warner Books, 2003). Another relevant sub-
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ject, both here and regarding our earlier discussion of "humility" is G.E. Moore, 
whose child-like delight and interest in the objections of even the most inexperi-
enced students to his most carefully drawn philosophical positions was legendary. 
Roberts and Wood, op. cit., p. 262, discuss Moore's humility. 
15. Here it could be objected that even such common practices are "telling 
yourself you can do it" involve epistemic vice insofar as they temporarily, at least, 
focus only on the reasons on one side. But this, I think, loses sight of the larger 
point, which is that our notion of epistemic virtue must ultimately tie in with our 
intuitions governing morality and the long temlS prospects of having true beliefs 
about the world. At the point that such first-person encouragement involves a 
degree of conviction that could lead one to take morally risky acts, then, I think, we 
must be concerned about its epistemic virtuousness or lack thereof. Likewise, at 
the point at which such affirmations threaten one's longer terms possession of true 
beliefs, we must be concerned. But neither of these is, in point of fact, threatened 
by such affirmations as "I will jump that wall" - especially when a tiger pursues. 
One might compare, in this connection, L.J. Cohen's distinction between "accep-
tance" and belief, properly so-called, "Belief and Acceptance," Mind 98 (1989), p. 
368. My notion of "affirmation" would be equivalent, I suppose, to a kind of Ifact of 
acceptance," in Cohen's terms. 
